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Introduction 
During my visits to Korea in the early 1990s， 1 was .Qvercome by 
1 also Let alone the surroundings. a strange feeling of dej，αvu. 
encountered the equivalent of the Peace Preservation Law that had 
existed in pre.war Japan， despite the democratizqtion that was 
announced in Korea on 29th of June in 1987. During February of 1988 
and May of 1989， more than three thousand people were reportedly 
arrested as "conscience prisoners" or political prisoners. This means 
that an average of 3.7 persons were arrested per day which reached 
The almost twice as many as that in the era of the Fifth Republic. 
Korean Chaebol are very similar to the Zaibalsu of prewar J apan. 
The radical labor movements and antagonistic state labor relations 
that boil in Korea are reminiscent of the situation in Japan during the 
1950s‘ As for the economic fundamentaIs， which 1 will explain later， 
the present indexes of Korea are almost identical to those of Japan 
Needless to say， Korean during the mid-1960 and early 1970s. 
high.tech industries are rapidly evolving in the forms of those of 
J apan and their development patterns are almost the same as those 
of Japan in the 1970s and the 1980s (Hattori ed.， 1987: 36). 
However， there are two conflicting opinions in the comparison 
between J apan and Korea. On the one hand， Korea is included in the 
??????
same category as Japan， especially in terms of its poIitical economy. 
The conceptualization of the capitalist developmental state by Chal. 
mers Johnson is a typical example of this case (Johnson 1982: 317， 
On the other hand， most of Korean 
They social scientists are reluctant to agree with western schoJars. 
Johnson 1990， Johnson 1994). 
would rather compare Korean politics with authoritarian regimes， 
particularly thu品位。fLatin American countries‘ Thus， how should we 
consider the conspicuous similarities and impressive differences 
between ]apan and Korea and how should we theoτetically concか
ptualize them? 
Myar宮umenthere is拙 follows:
Korean governing elites have adopted the post-war "Japanese 
systems" as a effective late-comer model. This introduction was 
carried out by the principles of elitism and formalism in the same 
way that the Japanese hacl introduced the western model into Japan. 
1t inevitably emphasizes an initiative by state bureaucrats and cen匂
ters around "institutions and organizations". As a result， however， 
the essence of J apanese詰ystems，which is based on代mutualreciproc-
ity and informalismぺbecomeslost in thεprocess of adoption. At the 
same time， since the governing elites have considered labor issues as 
a national security matter， they have taken a very different stance to 
industrial relations from that of post巴warJapan. This also damaged 
the introduction of ]apanese systems into Korea， because the 
]apanese system is constructed along overlapping networks among 
government， business and labor. Since the ]apanese networks devel-
oped from the micro-enterprise level to the national decision making 
level through the meso-industrial sector level， they provide intermedi- 七
/、
aries for information sharing that inspire cooperation and integration i¥ 
among the social actors n、sujinaka1993， 1994a). 
Consequently， although the institutional devices and economic 
perfonnance of the nation appear to be on the same path that ()f thε 
Olyrnpic years of 1964 in ]apan and 1988 in Korea， respectably， the 
五
government-business-labor relationships in both countries are inc1eed 
c1istinctively different. 
1. The essence of the Japanese system 
For Chalmers J ohnson， the problem of the developmental state of 
]apan lay in public-private relations. After the attempt of self‘ 
control and state-control， ]apan sought out public予riも!atecoopera-
tion as a synthesis. It has several mechanisms like government-
guaranteed financing， targeted tax breaks， government田supervised
investment coordination， equitable allocation by the state of burdens 
during times of adversity and so on (Johnson， 1982: 311). It is 
supported by numerous unusual institutions that include the 0伍cial
deliberation councils， MITI's vertical bureaus and the corresponding， 
ofticially sanctioned trade association of each Industry; the tempo-
rary exchange of ofticials between state and private enterprises; 
formal discussion groups and the practice of administrative guidance 
(J ohnson， 1982: 312)_ 
Ronald Dore conceptualizes the Japanese system as welfare 
(enterprise) corporatism. It is a successful adaptation of late industri-
alization coupled with several characteristics of the late comer e妊ect.
七 Doreput accent on industrial relations， which contain enterprise level 
天 bargainingand 配 gotiatio凡 anenterprise welfare system， stability of 
ハ employment，indistinctness between white and blue collar workers， 
business bureaucratization and cooperative and corporative ideology 
(1973: 370). 
Although Johnsun fucused un public-private relations and Dure on 
business-labor relations， both scholars shared the significance uf 
informal human relationships and human networks. In this line， 
Masahiko Aoki analyzed J apanese enterprises and characterized 
them as "corporative" (1988). Ken'ichi Imai introduced the concept of 
network systematical1y into industrial organizations in Japan (1988). 
Daniel Okimoto (1989) and Jaeho Yeom (1989) elaborated the net-
works focusing on the high時techindustrial poJicy in Japan. Richard 
Samuels presented the concept of引reciprocalconsent" in which firms 
give the state jurisdiction over markets in return for their continuing 
control over those markets (1987). He emphasized the aspect of 
mutual negotiation and persuasion. 
All these interpretations of the J apanese system agree on the 
significance of a relational or contextual aspect which was brought 
up thr-ough "a tortuous !earning and adaptation process" (Johnson 
1982: 306). This process can be characterized as a series of trials and 
errors that are， ina sense， democratic interactions. This process and 
relational aspect assure system integration and cooperation through 
mutual information sharing. 
2. Reception of the Japanese model in Korea 
Korea's introduction of the Japanese system as a model of indus- 七
四
trialization is very obvious， atleast in the appearance and functions fi. 
of governmental and socia! institutions. For inぉtance，the arrange-
ment of the Department of Commerce and Industry in Korea is the 
same as that of MITI in Japan. Moreover， a lot of afi!iated semi回
governmentaJ organizations in Korea have corresponding models in 
七
J apan (Hattori、1988:36)百 Apart of the Iist is as follow出:Japan 
External Trade Organizηtion vs. Korean External Trade Public 
Corporation， Japan Productivity Center vs. Korean Productivity 
Center二JapanExport and Import Bank vs. Korean Export and 
Import Bank， J apan Development Banl王vs.Ko1'ean lndustry Devel-
opment Bank， Japan Institute 01' Labor vs. Korean Institute of Labor. 
1n addition， governmental in日titutionssuch as the industrial stan-
dards， the tax system for expo1't promotion and the indust1'ial policy 
system also strengthen the adaptatiol1 of Japanese models. Finally， 
va1'ious social institutions， which had gradual1y evoJved as custOI1S in 
J apan. are implanted as government policies; Shosha 01' trading 
company， enterprise unIons， the business labo1' consu!tatio!1 system， 
quality control， and Keirelsu (Hatto1'i 1988: 35-36)ー Hattoriclaimed 
that Korea is one of the frontiers in the application of the J apanesぞ
model. 
Nonetheless， itis wo1'th noting that the initiative of applying the 
Japanese modeI seems to be limited to the strata of the只overning
elite and the business elite under the authoritarian regimes. That 
woulc1 partly explain the continual adveτ日ityagainst J apan that was 
evident in thεmajority of the mass司leveLHovvever these institutional 
arrangements successfully br・oughtabout the high eco!1omIc perforω 
七 mancein Korea that wil1 be described in the next section. 
/¥ 
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3. Korea in 1988 and Japan in 1964 
While the situations of business and labor and the 1'elationship 
between the two actors are very di丘町entfrom those of J apan il1 the 
mid-] 960s， itis noteworthy that outputs of the economic syちtemsof 
Korea in the mid 1980s and of Japan in the mid品 1960s孔reclos('. 
Table 1 shows the similarity網
The ratIo日ofthe agricultural and manufacturing work forces and 
the availability of teiephone might explain sim日arityin the social and 
ecol1omic life in both countries. The ratios of ag1'icultural work 
forces were 25.2% in Korea in 1984 and 24.7% in Japan in 1965. 
Those of manufacturing work forces were 24.7% in Ko1'ea and 31.5% 
in ]apan， resp<三ctively人 1ntl1e mid 1960s in Japan and the mid 1980s 
of rくり1'ea，rno1'e than り1Ietelephone f()r 10 persons was installecl 
Regardinぷt1emacro inclexes， GNP per capita in Japan in 1970 and 
that of Kor四 in1984， are very close. In addition， wages per month 
relative to American wages can be indicativc. The ]apanese wage in 
1960 was $63.17. 16% of that of the US and the Korean wage in 1980 
was $222.23， 18% of that of the US. The Japanese vvage in 1970 was 
$199，77， and the Korean wage in 1989 was $72:).41， which were 35% 
and 39%， respectably， of that of the U. S. (1m， 1992: 39). 
4. Utilization of the Japanese model in Korean labor policy 
The principle of utilizing Japanese labor laws and policies in 
Korea was seemingly not so different from that of other policy areas. 七
The Korean governing elite sometimes directly translatecl the articles 八
。flaws in Japan， stren広thenedthe regulation of， and formalizecl 
Japanese social customs. I will discuss the correspondence between 
the laws of these two countries in this sectiol1. However， their 
attitude and stance behind these Iaws were considerably clifferent 
九
]apan ]apan 
('60s) ('80s) 
98275(65) 121047(85) 
935(65) 12763(84) 
952(65) 9089(84) 
2009(70) 
9.0(65) 
8452 (65) 
36.4(60) 
Table 1 The Economic lndex of Korea in the mid-1980s and 
of ]apan in the mid-1960s 
Korea 
('80s) 
40578(84) 
811 (84) 
1998(84) 
Population (thousand) 
GNP ($1000 million) 
GNP per capita ($) 
28.3(84) 
17.0(84) 
29245(84) 
29.8(84) 
64.5(84) 
25.0(84) 
24.7(65) 8.8(84) 
73188(66) 185989(84) 
131 (65) 
30862(83) 
7647 (85) 
9711 (85) 
16880(85) 
5352 (85) 
4598(84) 
1747 (84) 
78852(84) 
24686(84) 
2.29(83) 
325画。(84)
217 (82) 
4‘4 (84) 
496 (82) 
31.5(65) 
9664 (65) 
696 (65) 
5363 (65) 
510(66) 
1.51(65) 
2640(67) 
32500(65) 
138 (66) 
258.8(65) 
:n. 4 (67) 
30.0(84) 
38.5(84) 
5743(84) 
29.2(84) 
60.1(84) 
24.7(85) 
25.2(85) 
21866(84) 
5743(83) 
262 (85) 
1473(84) 
3605(85) 
1864(85) 
792(85) 
759(84) 
20231 (85) 
2865 (84) 
1. 06 (83) 
23.2(82) 
87.2(84) 
1:~8 (84) 
118 (82) 
The % of investments in GNP 
The % of exports in GNP 
The amount of exports ($ mil1.) 
Th巴%of manufacturing in GNP 
Heavy chemical industry in manufac司
tunng 
The % of the manufacturing work 
force 
The % of the agricultural work force 
The output of pig iron products prod. 
ucts (thousand ton) 
The output of pig iron exports (thou-
sand ton) 
The number of vehicle products (thou-
sand) 
Shipbuilding tonnage 
The number ()f color TV set products 
(thousand) 
The number of refri災eratorproducts 
(thousand) 
The capacity of beer products (thou-
sand kl) 
The output of synthetic fiber products 
(thousand ton) 
The amount of cement products (thou-
sand ton) 
Atomic power plant capacities (thou-
sands kw) 
Thε% of scientific research funds in 
GNP 
The非ofrailway traffics (billion km 
passenger) 
The ton km of railway traffics (billion 
ton km freight) 
The diffusion of vehicles (person/vehi-
c1e) 
The diffusion of telephones (phone/ 
thousand persons) 
???〈?
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from those of the J apanese， which will also be explained in following 
sections. 
The Japanese influence over Korean labor laws has broken into 
First， there is direct transla-four categories (Hayashi 1990; i-vi). 
tion and implantation. The system of labor laws is divided into three 
parts; laws on collective industrial relations， laws on individual 
industrial relations， and laws on employment security. The composi-
tion of each part is almost identical to that of J apan except for the 
unique existence of the Labor-Management Consultation Law in 
Korea， but it lacks the equivalent of an employment insurance law 
that exists in Japan. There are a lot of phrases in these laws that are 
similar to those in J apanese laws. The Korean system of labor laws 
was first established by Singman Rhee in 1953 and supplemented in 
1963 by Park Chung-hee. 
The second category is the settlement of interpretative ambigu-
ities and problems in Japanese laws. In this category， Korean labor 
laws are more articulate and sometimes more pro-labor such as the 
denial of the compensation for the damage by strikes. 
In the third category， there are laws containing more advanced 
standards than those of Japanese laws based on the Japanese proto・
type such as legal work hours， extra pay for overtime work， hoIiday ??
?
??
work， legal compensation for industrial disaster， and enforcement of 
the Equal Employment Law. 
The fourth category embraces laws that formalized Japanese 
customs and social institutions. For instance， the 1980 revision of the 
Labor Union Law estabIished the enterprise union system in place of 
Although the 1987 revision of the law the industrial union system. 
permitted other types of union systems， the single union system or 
prohibition of plural unions in the enterprise subst乱ntiallyfoτbade 
new types of union systems in Korea. The second example is the 
enactment of the Labor-Management Consultation Law in 1980. The 
labor-management consultation system was first established due to 
the article in the 1963 revision of the Labor Union Law. The 1980 law 
made the establishment of this consultation system obligatory for 
about 5，000 big companies. 1n J apan， this system has been promoted 
by the J apan Productive Center and its collaborate counterpart 
among the labor unions in the late 1950s and 1960s. As a voluntary 
ba間 inJapan， about 80 percent of al companies with more than 100 
employees adopted this system in the 1980s (Nakamura 1988: 54). 
Besides the enterprise union system and the labor時managementcon-
sultation system， the Korean government has legislated the retire-
ment money system and the employee education system for the 
youth恥
ln general， the labor legislation mentioned above contains many 
advanced articles in terms of legal completeness and in many cases 
a tendency for labor protection. As will be described in the next 
section， however， the labor policy in Korea has been considered as a 
security matter by the governing elite. Thus， starting from this point 
ノて on， the Korean labor policy began to diverge clearly from the 
九
冗 Japanese model. 
5. Deviation from the Japanese Model: Korean labor Policy as 
an Internal Security Policy 
1 will show in the following how the governing elite in Korea has 
considered the labor policy as a key stone for Korean internal 
security. 
The first impressive fact is that al major revisions of labor 
relations laws were made simultaneously with the revisions of Consti-
tutions. ln addition， four out of five major revisions of labor relations 
laws were performed in certain "emergent legislative bodies，" during 
出erecess of Parliament (Yang ed.， 1988: 278-279). 
The system of Korean labor laws was established under the First 
Republic in 1953 after the first revision of the Constitution. The 
system includes the Labor Union Law (LUL)， the Labor Dispute 
Conciliation Law (LDCL)， the Labor Committee Law (LCL) and the 
Labor Standard Law (LSL). The content of this system maintains a 
stance that is highly pro-Iabor stance such as the principle of free 
establishment of labor unions， the autonomy and democracy of labor 
unions， the prohibition of disturbing activities by employers， and the 
recognition of the collective bargaining right by labor unions. 
The first revision of this system occurred under the military 
"revolutionary" regime of Park Chung-hee in 1963. The political 六
J¥ 
activity of labor unions has not been permitted ever since Park 完
forbade in the revision. ln addition， this revision strengthened the 
regulation of labor union establishments， limited the right to organize 
public servants， made a system that check the legality of Jabor 
disputes and established the labor司businessconsultation system. 
]、heちとcondmδrevision the October Yusin in 1972 
in which、 εlコγk設dndnislγatJο抗告trell主thf'ncdgO¥'色1'nm台ntlntcrven・
ti合nHnd clcooliticiz日 1設borm(ド/ement日曜 The third γevision was 
perfonned within the Januaryア 14th Emer問ntMぞみsunうsin 1974 in 
which thεadministration没ddedsome measures of worke1's' welfare. 
Before th五、 Yusin Iれと administratiol!世話tablishedthe Tenlp(ト
1'ary Ln可1'01'Labor UηiOl1S and Labor Dispute ConciIiation Concεγn即
ing Forei$守口Companies in 1970 which drastically limit付 theactivities 
of labor unions in foreign companies符
The fomサ1revision， which occurred in the bεginninεof the Chun 
Doo-huλn adnlinistration， was famol1s for compulョorilyintroducing 
compulsory enterprise unions in placぞ of1ひcalbranche君。fthe indnsω 
triai unlol1 system. The revision intended to isolate unions within 
el1terpriscs from inclustrial union自andthe national center (Hattori， 
1988: 201 202ト It only forbade union cねりperationa討 thirdpar!y 
intervention 01 thθside of ]計約了 unions. 01 the business side， 
cooperation bet¥veen emp!oyεrs and emp!oyers' organizatiol1日 was
not forbidden. 11 addition， procedures of labor disputes became rigid 
ちoas to substantially deny the right of dispute， ¥vhich. for instance， 
can bεse仔nin the long coolinεperiod of 1abor disputes (HattorI‘1988 
203). 
六 Onlythe last revision viほsdiscussed a日clpassed in the Parliament 
七1L alon反withthe 9th revision of the Korean Constitution in 1987， Even 
問
these revised lahor laws contain many constraints and limitationsのf
labor movements. 
The百econdpoint concerning the security-oriented nature of 
Korean labor policy revoJves around the problem目。fexisting labor 
Ie1¥VS， Undεr the upheaval of laboて l主10vemぞ日tsln 1987‘ thε Roh 
Tae-wむの administralionw詮$ tひ?とvisethe arr設ngelnentof itぉ
labor poIicy. It aholish♂cl the Spedal Me乳日りlreLaw fo1' Security. 
According to Yang KwarトSOO(1988: 278-299)， there are many 
serIous constraints in Ko開設1 1abo1' lav市s，even re交a1'din玄thεthrεe
.fund註mental1abo1' rights. I主sfo1' the to o1'ganize， the first 
barrier is the procedure fo1' labo1' unioJ1 establishmぞntThe Constitu‘ 
tion pγεscribes the 1'ight to organize voluntarily，ancl the Labor Union 
law only requires submissions of cleclaratio!1 ofεstablishment. 
However写 theEnforcement Ordinance of the Labor Union Law 
c1'eatecl the system screeninヌnewent1')ヘ Thissystem functions as if 
eve1'y labor union had to bεlicensed byヨuthority.
Second， the Labo1' Un10n Lawァ doesnot pe1'mit more than one 
la101' union at each level， which means that there must be a single 
union 1n each ente1'prise， a single industrial federation in each indus. 
try and a single national center in al of Ko1'ea. No new entry is 
permitted by the authority when a new g1'oup is conside1'ed as being 
redundant that existing labo1' unions ancl federatiuns alrとおdycovenid. 
This prohibitIon ()f plu1'ality Is preventing the appεa1'ance or new 
¥'oluntary labor uni例1S， Uncler the Iong 3utho1'itmian rule， the 
Federation of Ko1'ean T1'ade Union (FKTU) and the indust1'ial unions 
affiliated with FKTU have organiz吋 mostof the big ente1'pris台S. 六
Especially since the 1980 revisIon， compulsory ente1'p1'ise unions have 
p1'evailed. Thereaftt爪 despitethe abolishment ()f tl1e compulsory 
enterprise union system in 1989， the prohibition ()f plu1'ality su針:ained
the ente1'prise union system as a whole与 Manynew labor o1'ganiza-
tions including the new labo1' "national center"， namely， the National 
/、
Labor Union Council (NLUC)， are in danger of being accused as 
illegal at any time. 
The 1980 revision introduced the articles of "banning third party 
intervention in labor activities concerning the establishment and 
dissolution of labor unions and the participation and withdrawal of 
labor union members". Although the 1986 revision of labor laws 
loosened the definition of the third party so as to permit an activity 
to organize members that is practiced by industrial unions and a 
national center， these written articles stil exist and constrain the 
activities of labor unions. 
The restriction of labor rights of civil servants is very rigid in 
Korea. If we consider the relatively high proportion of national civil 
servants in the work force in Korea， specificaJly， 1l.6 civil servants 
per 1000 persons in 1987 compared to 7.1 in ]apan (calculation by the 
author)， this restriction has a significant meaning for labor 11love幽
ments. In Korea， the new Constitution prescribed that civil servants 
do not hold the three labor rights except for persons permitted by 
special law. As a fact only civil servants working for the Telecom. 
munication Department， the national railroad and the natioal hospital 
have rights to organize and bargain. 
Teachers are not entitled to the three labor rights regardless of 
六 whetherthey are teaching at a public school or private school. 
五
九
」ー‘
/、
However， the denial of the three labor rights f(lr private school 
teachers has no legal base. 
It is evident that Korean administrations， including the Roh 
administration， have "tried to keep workers away from organizing 
unions with al their efforts" (1m 1992: 8). 
The Korean labor laws placed heavy constraints on bargaining 
and strike activities by labor unions. The strike right of workers who 
are engaged in "major defense industries" prescribed by law is denied 
by the Constitution. Once the administration authorizes a certain 
industry as a defense industry， the strike right of the workers is 
forbidden regardless of whether the industryア isprivate or public. 
The cooling period prior to a strike is limited within the public 
utilities in Japan. However， inKorea al strikes， including private 
labor disputes， require the cooling period: 10-days for a private 
dispute; 15-days for a displlte of public ltility. The arbitration 
procedure can be extended one more rOllnd for a public ltility. Once 
an authority identifies the dispute as an emergency， the cooling period 
is extended 20 more days. As a result， the maximum cooling period 
for private disputes is 30-days， and for public 50-days. This kind of 
long cooling period substantially denies the right of strikes. Almost 
al strikes can be accllsed of being illegal due to the cooling period 
syste口1.
Finally， the procedure for determining strikes is rigid. The 
decision must be based on l11ajority approval by a direct secret ballet， 
and the strike activities are not allowed to perform olltside the work 
place. These limitations are highly rigid in comparison to other 
advanced cOllntries. ? ? ?
advanced aspects based on the Japanese model. Korean labor laws 
As a whole， 1 can conclllde that in spite of having several more 五
七
contain highly security-oriented characteristics so that the function 
of these laws is completely different from that of Japan in the 1960s. 
6. Labor Politics in Korea around 1990 
The differences of labor policy and labor law arrangement both 
countries have caused distictive di妊erencesin labor politics and the 
labor movement situation in spite of the similarities in economic 
peτformance and social life that were analyzed earlier. Before 
describing the labor situation， let us look at a statisticaI overview. 
As shown in Table 2， the Korean labor union density or organiza・1
tion rate gradually increased during出e1960s and 1970s， then showed 
temporary a drop and stagnancy in the 1980s， and has been resurgent 
since 1987. The di妊erencein density between Korea in 1962 and 
prewar ]apan is not notable. The rates of Korea， therefore， have 
been considerably lower than those of ]apan since 1960 (however， it
is interesting that labor union densities in both countries seem to be 
converging in the 1990s). Even after the resurgence in 1987， its rate 
is two明thirdsof that of ]apan in the 1960s. These can be attributed 
to出efollowing reasons: First， as analyzed in the previous section， 
many kinds of workers are stil forbidden to be organized and are 
constrained by the labor laws. Secondly， capitalists and owner担
managers in the Korean chaebol have shown an antagonistic attitude 
against labor movements， unlike ]apanese corporate capitalists and 
六 employee.managersin the 1960s (Yang， 1988: 244-277). Thirdly， in
冗 contrastto the ]apanese situation， fewer number of white collar 
J¥ () workers have participated in labor unions (Hattori， 1988: 20). 
Korean uniolls have not succeeded in integrating white collar and 
blue collar workers in the same unions. 
Tab!e 3 demonstrates the historical tendency of strikes and lock-
Table 2 Labor Union Density 
(Unionization H.ate) m 
Kυrea and ]apan 
]apan Kor巴呂
1925 5.6 
1930 7.5 
19:35 6.9 
1940 0.1 
1945 :'3.2 
1950 {i6.2 
1955 :35.6 
1960 32.2 
1962 3-L7 7.6 
1965 34.8 11.2 
1970 35.4 12.4 
197:i 34.4 14.8 
1980 30.8 12.9 
1985 28.9 15.7 
1986 28.2 15.5 
1987 27.6 17.3 
1988 26.8 22.0 
1989 25.9 23.7 
1990 25.2 25.0 
Sources: Ishih呂ta 1988・474同474， MOL 
]apan 1978: 116， MOL Japan 
1991: 378， Kim 1986: 82. 
outs in Korea and J apan. Surprisingly， the situatioll in Korea before 六
1986 shows considerable similarity to that of Japan before 1945. 五
However， the labor offensive during 1981' and 1989 was as intense as 
the Japanese labor offensive in 1952， during which the peak of worker 
involvement in and lost work days occurred. 
These statistical data seem to indicate that the labor situation in 
九
Table 3 Strikes and Lock目outsin Korea (1960-90) and ]apan (1910-88) 
]apan 
1910 19~O 19:，0 1940 1950 1952 1960 1965 1970 1988 。!C 22 282 906 271 584 590 106:， 1~42 22品。 498 
VVfT 2.1 :16.4 81.3 32.9 763.4 162:3.6 918.1 1682.:1 1720.1 75.9 
D/J 5486.1 150お:1 4昔12.2 5669.4 :，914.8 173. R 
Korea 
1960 1970 1980 1982 1984 1986 19x7 1988 ]989 1990 
D/C 256 4 206 88 114 276 3617 187:1 1616 322 
WiT 64.:1 日5 49.0 9.0 lfiA 46.9 934.9 293.6 396.5 
υ/J 61.:¥ 11.5 19.9 72.0 6946.り 5400.8 6J5L4 18:36.0 
D/C Number of strikes and 1υd←outs. 
¥v IT Workers involved (thousands) 
DIJ Work.days not worked ithousands). 
おりurces: 1m 1992: 40， lshihata 1990: 482， MOL Japan: 19RR: 128，13:3. 
Korea after 1987 is paralleel to that of Japan in the 1950s. This 
impression is confirmed by the instability of union leadership and the 
situation of the national center. During ]anuary and August， 1990，82， 
7 percent ()ut υf 2，071 unions experienced leadership change， 4:3β 
percent of which involved elections with tensions and conflicts caused 
by nonconfidence and resignation (Kim， 1991: 57). 
The Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) enjoyed its 
monopolistic status under the authoritarian regi紅1e，and stil remains 
the only national center in Korea. The leadership waぉ， however， 
六日ubstantiallydamaged in the face of emer・gingdemocratic labor 
unions against the policy of FKTU after 1987. The FKTU chose 
8 Park， a progressive leader， as a chairperson in N叩 E胤 1988.in 
order to wipe Ol1t the image of company l1nion or government suppor-
ting union. He was reelected in 1990 and proposed several new 
policies: "1) to make efforts to continl1e negotiation with democratic 
unions (NTLC) to integrate出elabor movement; 2) to promote 
political activities within the range permitted by existing laws; 3) to 
reconciliate the cleavage between progressive groups and conserva・
tive groups within FKTU; 4) to develop a legalistic movement in 
order to get citizen support" (Japanese Ministry of Labor 1991: 379). 
The National Labor Union CounciI (NLUC) was founded as a 
national center for voluntary labor unions in June， 1989. It was 
organized by putting fourteen regional labor union councils and three 
industry labor union councils together， ofwhich there were 602 unions 
with a membership totalling 193，000 persons， which is about 10% of 
the total number of unionized members. Since the Labor Union Law 
does not admit the second national center， the administration made 
an attempt to prevent its establishment. After its establishment， the 
administration did not permit its legal status and warned individual 
unions that affiliation with the NLUC， participation in the NLUC's 
activities and collecting membership fees for the NLUC can not be 
considered "legal". Thus， many unions seceded from the NULC， after 
which the NULC was reduced by half the number of its members and 
participated unions by March of 1991 (Kim， 1991: 57). 
In addition to FKTU and NLUC， two "potential" national centers 
are emerging. The National Employees' Union Council has thirteen 
affiliated federations most of which are non-legal unions. It occupies 六
0 
8.8 percent out of alI unionized members and 7.5 percent out of al 
labor unions. This council has characteristics in its attempt to 0 
organize white collar labor unions. In February of 1990， the Big 
Enterprise Labor Union Council for Solidarity was formed by sixteen 
big enterprise unions such as the Hyundai Automobile Labor Union， 
the Asia Automobile Union， the Seoul Subway Public Cりrpυration
Union， and the Lucky E柱、ctricWire Union. Both of these potential 
national federations could 10t formulate a cohesive 0τganizational 
policy because of their lack of consensus among their mernbers by the 
summer of 1991. 
Conclusion 
Thus， up until early 1990s， the Korean labor movement didn't have 
a national center， which is significantly equipped with concentration 
and legitimacy. 1、heofiicial center， FKTU， seem巴tobe losing its 
legitimacy and popular support. Therefore， its actual influence is not 
so different from that of otl1er non副legaland potential national 
centers. The NLUC as well as two potentials organize less thal1 10 
pe1'cent out of al labor unions al1d unionized m守口1bers.They lack the 
necessary concent1'atiol1 to inftuence busines日広roupsand the govern句
日lent.
In the cOl1nection between the vulnerability and weakness of labor 
unions and their national centers， 1くoreanlabo1' has not estab!ished 
stable relationship with the political parties (Choi， 1991c: 331). 
There seems to be 10 sub日tantiallinkagebetween opposition pa1'ties 
li and labor unions. As mentioned earlie1'， the ban of the political 
九
activities of labor unions due to the Labor Union Law is stil crucial 
o toconstrain tixmeLIMO11日. Oppositio!1 parties al50 emphasize t1'adi回
tional linkages with their constituents rathe1' than lab悶 unions.
ln sham contrast to the Korean situation in the late 19おOsand 
earJy 19908， ihぞJapanese labor l110vement moved towards託direction
。fstabilization and institutionalization in the mid.1960s (Tsujinaka 
19:j，1994a). The General Council of Trade Unions of Japan， namely， 
50!.り'0，was established in 1950 and kept its status as the national 
center until 1987. Sohyo's political influence was assured by the 
strong connections with the Japanese Socialist Party， which merged 
its left and right wings in 1955. 1n alllevels of elections， labor unions 
of public servants and public巴nterpriseworkers performed a big role. 
Through the adoption of a spring waεe bargaining rounc1， 5hunto， 
startec1 in 1955， 5ohyo gradually became involvec1 in business. 
government networks and became more moderate as a result. 
After the two symbolic events of 1960， the Mitsui-miike Minin只
Strike and the Stru以 iεoverthe US-Japan Mutllal Security Treaty 
Revision， the three parties in labor politics in J apan， which are 
government， business， and labor voluntarily started to cooperate with 
each other. 1n the mic1-1960s， the fruit of the coop巴rationappeared . 
The government c1ecided to leave the Constitution revision in 1964 
untouched and the LDP proposed the Labor Charter il1 1966. Bureau. 
cracies started to allow labor representatives to join important 
formal ac1visory councils anc1 semi-formal round tables in the 1960s. 
11 big businesses， enterprise unIol1s and employec1 managers began to 
coopeτate through Shunto and consultation boc1ies. In 1964， corpor-
ative private unions mac1e the International Metal Workers' Federa. 五
J¥ 
tion-Japan Council， or IMF-JC and the Japan Confederation of 
Labor， or D01nei. These two federatiol1s grew up to be the core {)f 9 
Rengo， or the 
Sohyo in 1989. 
Trade Union Confederation which absorbec1 
Needless to sayらKoreanlabOl‘ politics is in the process of transi晶
tion. Whether it is treading a path that is similar to the one taken by 
Japan in the 1960s depends on a possible change of relationships and 
institutional arrangement among three actors: government， busi. 
ness， and labor. Presently， they stil seem to refuse the convergence 
(Choi， 1993). The person and actor takes the initiative to change also 
will characterize the nature of future labor politics in Korea. 
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